​Why was it that the Europeans (and even the Soviets sort of) had supersonic flight, but Americans did not? Did it perhaps all come down to the engineers and their ability? In this article I will consider such questions in more detail so we can better understand how various factors affect your engineering and your chances of success when taking on big challenges.

Some background
Depending upon the newspaper you read, you might have seen this recent article in The Telegraph about the history of the Boeing 2707: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/comment/boeing-2707-america-lost-concorde. The Boeing 2707 is described in the article as “America’s lost Concorde”. Interesting words; how was it lost; circumstance; incompetence; tragedy; or is it about the loss of an engineering race? It leaves the reader wondering just how it is that America never had its own commercial supersonic aircraft.

The article argues that the Boeing 2707 did not succeed because of the following:

1. The Europeans got a headstart
2. The American design was too ambition carrying more passengers and being optimised for slower flight as well with swing-wings
3. Fickle political support
4. Potential for public backlash because of noise
5. Market realities – like those that saw the end of the Concorde

A global engineering lens
Would we reach the same conclusions if we look at this as global engineers? And, could we learn lessons from this consideration?

In my book, I cite another book (The Origins of Turbojet Revolution by Professor Edward Constant II) that compares the efforts to progress aeronautics in both Europe and America. Professor Constant noted that a lot of engineering in the U.S. was guided by commercial realities associated with longer flights (think New York to Los Angeles) carrying more people. This means larger planes with more comfort. In Europe, the focus was purer, and on fast efficient flights.

This offers potential insights into why the American design was too ambitious. There was still the notion of carrying a large number of people, which is congruent with large scale commercial operations. The swing-wing would increase efficiency during the slower portions of a flight – the beginning and the end. This is only significant for shorter flights such as domestic ones (that’s why they worried about people complaining about noise). Thus, it seems Boeing was making the 2707 a domestic and international plane – and thus increasing the potential for sales.

The Concorde on the other hand would get out of one country and stay at top speed until it reached its destination far away – disturbing no-one in between – a purest approach for a very specific (and small) market. Not very capitalistic at all.

Based on the above, we could argue that points 2 and 4 were ultimately more about culture overriding engineering decisions.

Points 1 and 3 can be combined. Indeed, the Europeans had a headstart, but so did the Soviets in the Space Race. The U.S. could have caught up and surpassed if they really wanted to. But there was no perceived national security threat as there was in the Space Race. So political support, being both delayed and then reduced, likely played a role.

And considering point 5, the U.S. government was probably overly spooked to support commercial supersonic flight in the first place, and wise to reduce support later on. Assuming it was all about direct commercial gain and there was no interest in the value of spin off technologies.

Lessons for engineers
Culture can cause you to create an engineering design brief that is not well aligned with the laws of physics. This can sometimes be through your commercial attitudes. Make sure you are realistic about your commercial goals and that they are aligned with engineering realities.
​
And if they are not aligned, then accept that you will need something like government support to succeed. Failure is not a result of engineering skill – or lack thereof. Although it might be a result of engineers not challenging culture with sound engineering principles. You need, at times, to combine engineering and commercial reasoning to find the right direction forward – which might mean ceasing efforts.

So will America have a supersonic commercial airliner?
The Boom Overture, scheduled for release in 2029, has tried scale models already. It shows similarities with the Concorde – delta wings and fewer passengers. And the company seems to be focused on offering a speedier alternative to business class flights along long flights – showing a combination of commercial thinking with engineering thinking.

So yes, I do think there is a good chance that the U.S. will indeed have a supersonic commercial airliner.

But what do you think?

In this article I will talk about cultural shocks and how to handle them. But I am going to talk more about one that few expect. After reading it, you will be better able to manage transitions between roles and, if you are a manager, help other better manage the transition.
First of all, let’s consider some of the different things that can affect engineering practice and culture. The main ones are:

You can probably understand from the above how you could experience significant differences in how engineers go about engineering as you move from one country to another. Especially when those two countries have very different cultures.
However, when the differences are that large, we are often fore warned (and thus prepared) about those differences.
It is the cases where you expect there to be fewer differences that you are more likely to suffer. The cultural consultant and author The Culture Map, Erin Meyer noted that the case where there is the greatest failure in professional transfer is between the U.S. and the U.K. People assume that the cultures are sufficiently similar enough that they do not need to mind those differences – this complacency then causes issues.
In my experience and from my research though, there is an even greater (and less noticed) factor that can cause issues for engineers: typical budget sizes.
This can have a tremendous effect upon how engineers go about their jobs.

• Do you take larger risks on each step of a program so that you spend less on each step?
• Do you have the time and other resources to optimise every aspect?
• Should you be leveraging of the shelf components and system or using custom designs and services?
• Do you conduct hand calculations or do you utilise a dedicated simulation team?
• Do you rework parts or just scrap them and move on?
• Do you try to make it work with run of the mill materials or can you start trying exotic materials from the onset?
• Are independent test laboratories given the final system so only one test needs to be done, or do you send them a full system after you come up with each new feature?

These are just a handful of examples of the things that can be dependent upon how well funded your engineering project is. But, the list still shows how you could tend to take certain courses of action if you have become accustomed to a certain budget size in the engineering roles you have had in the past.
An example from some of my research.
This was some time ago when I spoke with engineers in the automotive industry. It was noticed that Australian and Chinese engineers were better able to work with each other than either could with American engineers. Why was this, given the greater cultural similarities between Australian and Americans? At that time, the Chinese automotive industry was not the juggernaut that it is today – few had heard of BYD, and Great Wall was only just starting to be associated with cars. Instead, it was an industry that ran on much tighter developmental budgets. Much like the Australian industry also was at that time. Today, while the Chinese industry has grown, the Australian industry is essentially dead – so obviously the trends were in opposite directions while at that time there was an intersection.
What does this mean for you?

1. If you are an engineer changing companies, then really focus on how this aspect of the new company is different (if at all) from what you are used to. Then, each time you are thinking about your strategy for an engineering endeavour, double check if you have made any erroneous assumptions based unconsciously on what you think the budget would be.
2. If you are a manager who has new people coming in, then a good way to help them become accustomed to the new company is to talk to them about how they progressed such projects in the past. Do this within the context of budgets so you can be explicit with them if things are different from what they are used to.
3. If you work across global teams, make budget assumptions explicit early. It prevents mismatched expectations and helps align design philosophy from day one.

Budgets can be more of an issue than cultural differences (or even a cause of those differences). Noting the above will help you be more of a global engineer and let better managing this rarely considered issue. ​

​The recent tariffs announced by the Trump administration—imposed on pretty much every other country in the world—have drawn a lot of criticism from economists.
And from other countries.
And from his domestic opponents.
But could things look different from an engineering perspective?
In this piece, I’m going to cover why economists are so opposed to tariffs—and then explore whether there might actually be an engineering opportunity we have not yet noticed.
​
Why Economists Hate Tariffs
Tariffs are supposed to protect local industries and jobs. Intuitively, that seems great—cut out foreign competition, and locals get to keep their jobs. Or, in Trump’s case, bring jobs back.
But in the current U.S. context, two things complicate that picture:

1. Low unemployment
2. A strong currency with high purchasing power

That means if jobs are going to be brought to the U.S., then companies need to do two difficult things:

1. Pay more than they would in another country, to match U.S. dollar purchasing power; and
2. Pay even more again to lure people away from the jobs they already have—because most Americans already are employed.

So any product made in the U.S. under this model comes at a higher cost. And those higher costs get passed on to customers.
And there is evidence of how tariffs do actually put prices up. But not in living memory for many. One of the few places where people in a developed economy can recall the effects of tariffs is Australia. In the 1970’s Australia was only just introducing colour T.V. But this was stifled by tariffs. The tariffs were there to protect the local radio and television manufacturing industry – but the effect was that a colour T.V. would cost around 9 weeks’ pay. Australians were not impressed, but they still wanted their colour T.V. Tariffs dropped from around 180% to 35% to 5%. A lot of industries were lost, but a lot of things became affordable. You can watch a 17 minute video on this topic below.

Adam Smith, almost the first of classical economics, argued over 200 years ago against tariffs — even retaliatory ones — because they only hurt your own citizens.
 
Can Engineering Offer an Alternative?
All of this assumes that the technology of production stays the same. That’s a key point. It’s essentially a zero-sum view.
But what if innovation could shift the game entirely?
In my book, I argue that engineers—when thinking about economics—should be Schumpeterian. Joseph Schumpeter believed that real economic growth doesn’t come from reshuffling jobs or trade balances. It comes from innovation. From finding ways to do more with less. That’s how societies get richer. Fewer people needed to make a car, a fridge, or a bag of doughnuts. More output per person.
But innovation doesn’t just happen. It needs a driver.
And unfortunately, fear has often been one of the most effective motivators.
Take WWII. It produced radar, jet engines, penicillin, and kickstarted the computing revolution. Or the space race—another fear-fueled scramble—gave us satellites, advanced materials, and a cascade of spin-off technologies we now take for granted.
Even in peacetime, we’ve seen what can happen under pressure. During COVID, I was part of a project that turned an empty office space into a factory. And thousands of ventilators were built in a matter of months.
So here's the question: what if the fear of tariffs and economic stagnation could be channeled into a national innovation push? Could the U.S. become dramatically more productive—not by avoiding the cost of labour, but by needing less of it?
 
Why Hasn’t This Happened Already?
We have the tools. Automation, AI, robotics—these technologies exist. As an engineer, you’ve probably noticed just how much day-to-day human labour could already be automated. Diagnosing illnesses. Servicing vehicles. Even preparing food.
So why haven’t we gone all-in?
Two reasons, I think:

1. Economists tend to default to comparative advantage
   They prefer frameworks where countries do what they’re “best” at. That often leads to outsourcing and doesn’t put much value on building new capabilities.
2. It’s just plain hard to imagine an economy without people
   Let’s be honest. The idea of a society where most of us are no longer “needed” economically is both utopian and hard to believe. I must confess, I struggle to envision how it would work.

 
The Trump Thought Experiment
But imagine the benefits if Trump rallied resources to develop this kind of innovation to make as many people as possible redundant. There would be ample people to take on these jobs he wishes to bring into the U.S. And, what’s more, there would be a huge increase in the amount of production per person. The wealth increase would be phenomenal. This would then set an example for the rest of the globe. And all would then enjoy an increase in wealth when they did the same thing.
But that would require two things:

1. Fear
2. Imagination

Not a common combination.

What’s the takeaway?
The above does seem fanciful. Like I said, I can’t imagine an economy free of people. I think it would make for an excellent challenge for economists though. But still, it helps us think about just how much we could improve things if we really focused on seriously on eliminating the need for us.
And who knows, there are times when history takes a turn no-one saw coming