It’s a new project or part of one.
It needs to be delivered quickly. It also needs to be reliable, inexpensive, easy to manufacture, easy to service and compliant with all applicable standards.
There’re only enough resources (time, people, money) for one serious attempt.
So the obvious plan is to simply get it all right the first time.
And everyone seems to be onboard with the idea.
This is home run engineering.
It’s the belief (actually it’s hope) that an engineering team can step up to a new and complex challenge, take one enormous swing, and achieve everything in one go.
It sounds ambitious. Some would say aggressive. It is usually naive.
And it can tell you something important about whether you should remain with your current company or not.
What is home run engineering?
In baseball, a home run allows the batter to complete the entire circuit in one play. There is no need to progress from base to base through a series of smaller hits.
Home run engineering follows the same logic.
Instead of developing, testing, learning and improving, the organisation expects one major effort to produce the finished outcome. The first prototype is expected to be close to the production design. The first implementation of a new process is expected to work across the entire organisation.
The term itself will rarely be used. Because no-one wants to admit they’re doing it.
You might instead hear:

• We need to get it right the first time.
• We only have one shot at this.
• There is no time for another prototype.
• Failure is not an option.

It might even be described as a Hail Mary. Although that expression usually refers to a desperate final attempt, so it’s wore honest while being just as concerning. Home run engineering is more often placed in the project plan from the beginning.
The language can make the approach sound focused and courageous.
But confidence is not an engineering method.
Why companies try it
Home run engineering normally appears when corporate strategy and engineering reality are no longer aligned.
The company might have promised a delivery date before the engineering work was properly scoped. It might have committed to a fixed price without understanding the technical risk. Or it might simply have fewer engineers, less money or less time than the challenge requires.
None of these pressures changes the engineering reality.
They only create an incentive to pretend that reality is different.
It is not really a national culture issue. Although cultures that are more heavily influenced by notions of karma and mind over matter might be more susceptible to this tendency.
It is mostly an organisational culture issue.
This can happen more often in a startup where:

1. the runway is more likely to be disappearing as funds dry up, or
2. earlier evaluation trials were less demanding so people are not accustomed to the greater demands of actual implementation.

But it can also happen in a large and established organisation. Probably where a senior manager has made a commitment and does not want to take it back.
Co-evolution means you cannot know everything at the start
In my book on being a global engineer, I discuss the notion of co-evolution.
Many people describe engineering development as iteration. You develop a solution, test it, make changes and then try again.
But there is more.
As you develop the solution, you also develop your understanding of the problem. The problem and the solution evolve together.
You do not merely improve the answer.
You improve the question.
This is why prototypes reveal issues that no meeting, calculation or simulation identified. A component is more difficult to assemble than expected. A user holds the product differently from how the designers imagined. A supplier cannot maintain a tolerance. Two individually successful subsystems behave differently when connected.
This perspective should show to you just how risk the home run engineering approach can be.
Example 1: There was no obvious way into space
Today, when you think of early human spaceflight, you probably imagine a capsule on top of a rocket.
It seems obvious.
But it was not obvious at the time.
A NASA history of the early space program describes four different American approaches to putting a person into space:

1. The research aeroplane. Fly higher and faster until the aircraft reached the fringes of space.
2. The ballistic vehicle. Put a capsule on top of a rocket, launch it into space and let it return through the atmosphere with little aerodynamic control.
3. The boost-glider. A rocket would boost a winged vehicle into space and it would return by gliding through the atmosphere.
4. The lifting body. Something between a conventional aeroplane and a ballistic capsule. Its shape would generate some lift without relying upon large wings.

These were not four minor variations of the same design. And none were a clear home run. All involved knew that different approaches needed to be explored.
And the Soviet Union did something similar. They used competing design bureaux, each exploring its own idea:

• Korolev’s bureau developed the spherical Vostok ballistic capsule.
• Pavel Tsybin’s bureau worked on the PKA, or Lapotok, a reusable gliding spacecraft.
• Vladimir Myasishchev’s bureau developed the M-48/VKA-23 spaceplane concept.
• Vladimir Chelomey’s bureau then pursued its Raketoplan and Kosmoplan families of reusable spacecraft.

Obviously, space travel is a major task, and no-one would suggest a home run approach. But it is a reminder to think seriously about the size of the challenge being taken on.
Example 2: The modern car
Consider the layout of a modern car.
Usually there are four wheels. The front wheels steer. The driver uses a steering wheel and pedals. In a conventional internal-combustion vehicle, the engine has commonly been at the front.
This arrangement now seems obvious.
But it was not obvious to the early automotive engineers.
The Benz Patent-Motorwagen had three wheels, a rear-mounted single-cylinder engine and tiller steering. Other early vehicles used steam or electric power. Engines appeared at the front, rear and beneath the occupants. Controls included levers, tillers and pedals in combinations that would feel completely foreign to a modern driver.
It took considerable trial and error of an entire industry to get to the layout we now have.
Example 3: The first successful aeroplane
The Wright brothers provide another example.
Their successful powered flight in 1903 followed years of experiments with kites and gliders. When their 1900 and 1901 gliders did not perform as expected, they did not simply build a larger engine and hope for the best.
They questioned the data.
They built a wind tunnel, tested many wing forms and used what they learned in the 1902 glider. That aircraft helped them develop the control knowledge and piloting skill required for powered flight.
The famous flight was not a home run.
It was the visible result of many earlier swings.
Different engineering: different speeds (how a move could bring you unstuck)
Home run engineering can become especially likely when someone moves from an industry in which changes are relatively fast and inexpensive into one where each learning cycle is slower and more costly.
Consider the following:

• A software team might release an update, observe its performance and issue another version within days.
• An electronics change might require a new board revision and further compliance testing.
• A mechanical change might require new tooling and another physical build.
• A civil engineering change might involve approvals, heavy equipment and concrete that cannot simply be rolled back.

This is not an absolute hierarchy. Some software changes are extraordinarily consequential, and some mechanical prototypes can be modified in minutes.
The point is that the cost and speed of learning differ between engineering contexts.
So if you move industries or work with another one, take the time to understand just how involved a project is. Lest you be the one asking for a home run.
How to recognise home run engineering
You will know it when you see it, even though nobody will use the term.
Some signs are:

• The first prototype is expected to be suitable for customers.
• There is funding for implementation, but not for exploration.
• The schedule contains design and delivery, but no meaningful time for learning and redesign.
• Tooling, procurement or construction begins before major uncertainties have been resolved.
• Testing is planned only as final verification.
• Engineers who raise uncertainty are described as negative or insufficiently commercial.
• The project can succeed only if every major assumption turns out to be correct.
• People throw the term “calculated risk” around without actually doing the calculation.

One of these signs does not automatically mean the company is badly run. But if you start to see a pattern of such things then consider a move.
When it’s time to leave
Every company will occasionally create a bad schedule or make an overconfident commitment.
That alone is not a reason to resign.
What matters is what happens when engineering reality becomes clear.
Does leadership adjust the strategy? Does it reduce the scope, move the deadline, add resources or create a staged development plan? Are prototypes treated as learning tools? Are engineers rewarded for revealing problems early?
If not, and your company repeatedly relies upon home run engineering, and refuses to change when the problem is made clear, then it might be time for you to take your engineering ability somewhere else.

The speech addresses several key concepts:

• The separation of design and manufacturing: Can it be done or not?
• The idea that design ability is innate, potentially influenced by race or culture.
• The tension between lower costs (especially from labor) and innovation.
• The issue of stagnating productivity.

 
I've noticed that people tend to focus on different aspects of these notions, often influenced by their prior beliefs, especially those regarding globalization.
 
This newsletter is called "The Global Engineer". It emphasizes the importance of being an engineer capable of working anywhere in the world and in any role (within reason). Therefore, I do not identify as an anti-globalist. In fact, I believe globalization offers significant advantages for engineers.

• The laws of nature are universal, allowing engineers to work in different countries and leverage their qualifications for greater adventure in their careers.
• Globalization enables regions to specialize, fostering advancements and accelerating the progress of engineering, which can lead to a more engaging career for all engineers.

 
I think the Vice President's speech raises important questions about how globalization has affected engineering and what we can anticipate for the future. He rightly points out that design should be closely linked to manufacturing. I often discuss the importance of concurrent engineering. It’s refreshing to see a politician with such insights into technology — from my experience, there are only a few who possess this understanding. Given the significance of concurrent engineering, we can expect that regions previously thought of as mere manufacturing hubs will also start to engage in design work. Additionally, as wealth becomes more evenly distributed, we will see manufacturing return to other areas – maybe after going those areas still not developed.

I don't believe we will see the old design leaders reclaim their dominance. Despite Japan's recent economic challenges, it has not lost its engineering design capabilities developed in the mid-20th century - capabilities that the rest of the world learned. Instead, we are likely to see more regions cultivate their own ingenuity. Engineers everywhere aspire to do more; they seek to innovate, and as I argue in "The Global Engineer," anyone can develop the essential skills needed.

I agree that many managers often prioritize low costs over investing in innovation, viewing the latter as an expense rather than an investment. This perspective is common among shareholders as well. Al Dunlap, known for his aggressive cost-cutting strategies, serves as a poignant example; despite his controversial practices, many supported his approach.
 
However, innovation should also focus on cost reduction, as improving efficiency can enhance our quality of life without necessitating a trade-off. The use of low-cost labor is often a case of arbitrage that may eventually become unfeasible, yet it has helped lift around 400 million people out of poverty globally, making it difficult to argue against from a moral standpoint. However, we must consider the long-term effects: as skills develop in less affluent regions, those areas may no longer remain inexpensive.

The Vice President also suggests that the preference for low-cost labor over innovation has contributed to stagnating productivity. While this viewpoint may resonate with those outside the engineering field, engineers understand the principle of diminishing returns. Increased productivity typically arises from larger, more efficient production systems, but eventually, it becomes challenging to scale much more, leading to a slowdown in productivity growth. Therefore, attributing stagnation to a drop in innovation caused by globalization is misguided.
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In summary, while the Vice President raises valid points about the importance of keeping production close to design and the role of innovation, the assumption that any location can inherently excel in innovation is flawed. There must be continuous investment in this capability at the societal, organizational, and individual levels. You can take responsibility for your own development. Then you can leverage globalization to further enhance your skills even more. You can also lobby your respective organization an government for such investment – you can also expect less opportunity as an engineer when your country chooses not to engage the rest of the globe.